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Existing research on public attitudes toward immigration policy in the United States is 
divided. Lack of contact with immigrants and threat perception are two popular 
determinants that allegedly explain restrictionist attitudes; in contrast, individual financial 
standing is often overlooked. This paper challenges the claim that financial 
considerations play no role in the formation of public opinion toward immigration. Using 
2020 Amazon Mechanical Turk survey data, an ordered logistical regression model 
reveals a robust link between financial security and immigration preferences, with those 
better off being more likely to favor greater restrictions. Although findings on income are 
less certain, they suggest that middle earners may be more preferential toward 
establishing greater restrictions than low or high earners. Surprisingly, proponents of 
immigration restrictions are found less likely to feel threatened by COVID-19 or election 
fraud. This contradicts threat theory and bolsters the argument that, in the context of 
competing influences on immigration attitudes, money talks.
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 "Xenophobia" is a term used with increasing frequency today by mainstream 
media sources. Coming from the Greek words xenos (either "stranger" or "guest") and 
phobos ("fear" or "flight"), the word is broadly applied to mean the fear and hatred of 
strangers or foreigners. Today, due in part to the prevalence of migration crises such as 
the Syrian civil war, increased flows of migrants from the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador) to the United States, and the Venezuelan migrant crisis, 
xenophobia is experiencing a moment of global escalation and, thus, merits further study 
by political researchers. 
 Understanding what factors lead people to adopt restrictive attitudes toward 
immigration is increasingly important today. With conflict or severe economic and 
political instability on the rise globally, the number of immigrants correspondingly has 
increased over time to a current total of 272 million.1 This constitutes 3.5% of the 
world’s population. Given this increase, it is important to better understand what factors 
shape public perception on immigration in order for governments to invest in policies that 
ensure social order and proactively reduce xenophobic tensions or violence.  
 Social scientists have worked extensively to develop theories on the root causes of 
xenophobia. Two notable ones are Gordon Allport’s contact theory that supposes that 
those with more contact with immigrants will be less prejudiced than those with less 
contact and Blalock’s group threat theory which asserts people who are predisposed to 
feel more threatened in general are more likely to favor more restictionist policies. In 
contrast to these popular theories, other speculations that financial incentives influence 
                                               
1 International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2020, 21. 
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immigration attitudes are often overlooked. Nevertheless, although the field is rich in 
theory, much of what is assumed about public opinion on immigration remains untested. 
 This study uses 2020 survey data to test the relationship between individual 
financial circumstances and immigration, using an ordered logistic regression model.2 At 
the same time, it probes Blalock’s threat theory by comparing immigration attitudes to 
other measures of threat. The findings on the financial indicators demonstrate that those 
who view themselves as better off financially this year as opposed to last year are more 
likely to favor greater restrictions. Additional evidence indicates that middle earners may 
be more preferential toward establishing greater restrictions than low or high earners. 
Further investigation into immigration attitudes and other measures of threat finds that 
those who feel threatened in other aspects of their life are actually less restrictive in their 
immigration attitudes, in contrast to threat theory.  
 These findings leave the social science research community with several 
important implications. Firstly, individual financial factors are important in defining 
public opinion on immigration attitudes and deserve consideration among other theories. 
Secondly, other prevalent theories that surround immigration attitudes need to be probed 
more deeply through statistical analysis, given that evidence here was found to contradict 
them. And finally, a more comprehensive assessment of determinants must be undertaken 
in order to best inform policymakers and the larger research community of how 
underlying factors shape public opinion and should, in turn, inform future policies. 
The sections that follow lay out in greater detail the literature review and theoretic 
framework for the paper, define the data and methods included in the study, present the 
key findings, and provide concluding thoughts to guide further research on the topic. 
                                               
2 Johns Hopkins University AS.470.764.81.SU20 Survey Methodology Course, "SU20 survey final" 
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2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 Xenophobia is a human condition that U.S. social science researchers have 
explored in detail over the past century. It has been most often assessed through opinion 
toward anti-migrant or restrictionist immigration policies. Such policies, while much 
contested today in the United States, were first introduced as far back as the early 1880s, 
when an increase in the immigrant population, notably of groups from southern and 
eastern Europe, and economic recession took place.3 What caused disapproval of 
immigrants then and what factors contribute to people’s favor of restrictionist policies 
today?  
 A number of theories have been developed; none is perhaps more widely 
acknowledged than Gordon Allport’s contribution of a cognitive perspective toward 
ethnic prejudice, which proposes that ethnic categorization and stereotyping is part of 
ordinary information processing based on faulty and inflexible generalizations which can 
later lead to prejudice and discrimination.4 Among the supporting evidence for this 
theory is a sociology experiment in Princeton University that asked students to select five 
traits from a list of 84 adjectives to describe 10 different groups.5 This study found that 
attitudes were shaped by stereotypes of cultural pattern and not based upon animosity 
toward a member of the group because of any inherent qualities they possess. 
This early research led Allport to propose contact theory as a principal 
determinant of prejudice. According to contact theory, under appropriate conditions 
interpersonal contact could be an effective way to reduce prejudice between majority and 
                                               
3 Espenshade and Hempstead, "Contemporary American attitudes", 537. 
4 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice. 
5 Katz and Braly “Racial stereotypes”, 280. 
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minority group members.6 Other studies have challenged this theory as simple and 
optimistic, claiming “changes in ethnic relations occur following intergroup contact, but 
the nature of this change is not necessarily in the anticipated direction; ‘favorable’ 
conditions do tend to reduce prejudice, but ‘unfavorable’ conditions may increase 
intergroup tension and prejudice”.7  
Whether contact between majority and minority groups has led to more positive 
or negative results has been much contested. Some studies propose a negative contact 
hypothesis, whereby intergroup contact may have more negative than positive effects on 
prejudice because it brings visibility to the minority group; however, these negative 
effects may be significantly reduced among individuals that have positive or extensive 
past contact with the minority group.8 The rejection-identification model and rejection-
disidentification model, which associate negative contact experiences with 
disidentification with the majority group and identification with the minority group lend 
further support to contact theory.9 
 Critics of contact theory have argued that there is a lack of evidence for Allport’s 
assumption that prejudice causes discrimination and do not think that his theory fully 
explains the long-term movement in racial sentiment. Instead of being merely descriptive, 
they urge researchers to further investigate “societal and institutional determinants of 
ethnic tensions and conflicts.”10 These include contextual factors such as the larger 
environment of class structure, political environments, economic forces, and population 
distributions. 
                                               
6 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice. 
7 Amir, “Contact hypothesis”, 319. 
8 Paolini et al., “Positive intergroup contact”, 548. 
9 Sixtus et al., “Positive and negative contact”, 904. 
10 Katz, “Nature of Prejudice”, 131. 
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While contact theory stresses the importance of individual perceptions of certain 
races, others stress that the relative position of the majority group and minority group 
(often referred to as in-group and out-group dynamics) are what gives rise to prejudice 
and discrimination. This is commonly called group threat theory or racial threat theory, 
which shifted the study of xenophobia away from “preoccupation with feelings as 
lodging in individuals to a concern with relationship of racial groups.”11 The theory 
highlights several feelings that are associated with racial prejudice in the majority group 
with respect to its relative position, including superiority over the minority group, 
difference from the minority group, proprietary claim to privilege and advantage over the 
minority group, and fear and suspicion of the minority group’s designs on the prerogative 
of the majority group.12 
 Hubert Blalock further defines this relational prejudice in terms of threat, arguing 
that the relations between majority and minority groups vary according to the degree of 
threat that the minority group poses to the majority group’s position of power and social 
control.13 These threats can be economic (including the loss of jobs or opportunities), 
political (involving fear of ceding political control to minority groups), or symbolic 
(perceiving that the beliefs or values of the majority group are at risk). This study is 
particularly concerned with the first of these types of threats and how it affects public 
attitudes toward immigration policy. 
Research on how economic factors affect public opinion has given rise to four 
principal hypotheses: job threat, resources, tax burden, and pessimism. Perhaps one of the 
most common arguments made against immigrants is that they take jobs away and 
                                               
11 Blumer, “Racial Prejudice Group Position”, 3. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 Blalock, Minority-group relations. 
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depress wages in selected occupations. According to the job threat hypothesis, those that 
are in particularly vulnerable labor market situations, based on such factors as 
occupation, unemployment, or job security concerns, are more likely to oppose 
immigration.14 Generally, such competition is most significant for those in low-skill, low-
wage occupations. A related resources hypothesis asserts that people who are 
experiencing financial stress will be more likely than those in a superior financial 
position to fear the implications of immigration. 
Several research efforts have come out in support of the job threat and resources 
hypotheses. A multivariate analysis of the 1992 through 2000 National Election Study 
(NES) surveys revealed a robust link between an individual’s position in the labor market 
and immigration policy.15 Respondents of low skill levels were found to support more 
restrictive policies, while respondents of higher skill levels tended to favor more liberal 
ones. Skill here refers collectively to occupation, income, and education level. Another 
study on NES data from 1992 to 1996 confirms these findings, suggesting that 
individuals who are less skilled are more concerned about immigration adversely 
affecting their wages.16 This study also found no evidence that this relationship was 
stronger in high-immigration communities than those with fewer immigrants. Such a 
finding challenges threat theory, which postulates that the size and growth rate of the 
minority group is positively associated with the amount of threat the majority group feels 
with respect to their social control.17 
Further support for the job threat and resources hypotheses comes from a 1993  
                                               
14 Citrin, et al., “Public opinion toward immigration”, 861. 
15 Kessler, “Immigration, economic insecurity”, 17-18. 
16 Scheve and Slaughter, “Labor market completion”, 133. 
17 Blalock, Minority-group relations. 
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CBS/New York Times that asked respondents whether they would like to see the level of 
immigration increased, decreased, or kept the same.18 Again, respondents of low 
education and low income expressed greater reservations about increasing immigration, 
suggesting that economic insecurity is significant in determining policy preferences.  
Some may argue, however, that rather than economic insecurity, these are signs of a 
cultural effect—that by increasing education majority group members become more open 
and tolerant of minorities so they are less likely to be antagonistic toward them and favor 
restrictionism.19 2001 analysis data from the General Social Survey found effects of race, 
income, and fear of crime to be significant; education is among the independent variables 
that most affect cultural opinion, along with political ideology, age, and sex.20 Critics of 
this hypothesis argue that highly educated people are not less xenophobic; they are 
simply better at giving socially desirable answers in questionnaires.21 A randomized-
response investigation found that while there is a social desirability bias in effect, that 
degree of bias remains consistent across different education levels.  Further efforts are 
needed to discern the extent to which cultural effect or resource scarcity explains why 
people with lower education or income oppose immigration.   
Job security and wages may not be the only economic factor to consider. A 
separate study also looked into whether concerns over the fiscal burden of immigrants 
may also affect individual’s policy preferences.22 These include such ramifications as 
crowding in access to existing government services and the costs of goods or services. 
This study illustrates a third hypothesis beyond economic threat—that of tax burden. The 
                                               
18 Espenshade, “Contemporary American Attitudes”, 535. 
19 Clark, “Cash, schools, and immigrants”, 27. 
20 Chandler and Tsai, “Social factors”, 177. 
21 Ostapczuk, Musch, and Moshagen, “A randomized-response investigation”, 920. 
22 Gerber et al., “Self-interest, beliefs, and policy”, 155. 
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tax burden hypothesis asserts that those that feel that immigration will negatively increase 
the cost of or limit access to government benefits will strengthen support for restrictionist 
policies.23 Beyond income, this implies a new causal explanation; people who resent their 
level of taxes or life in states with relatively high taxes or large concentrations of 
immigrants are more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant policy preferences than those who 
have lower levels of anxiety about taxes. This relationship may be inelastic to differences 
in income or education level.   
A final hypothesis of pessimism stresses the influence of the individual’s 
perceptions of economic change. Here, regardless of their level of financial resources, the 
logic that if one is “on a downward economic trajectory,” they will believe immigration 
has a more tangible cost to them and will, therefore, have greater restrictionist 
sentiment.24 Again using NES data, in this case from 1992 through 1996, multiple studies 
found that “personal economic circumstances play little role in opinion formation, but 
beliefs about the state of the national economy, anxiety over taxes, and generalized 
feelings about … immigrant groups are significant determinants of restrictionist 
sentiment.”25 Overall, these studies find cultural norms or values to be stronger 
determinants of immigration policy preferences than economic ones.   
Diverging results in recent studies signify that scientific inquiry into economic 
effects on immigration attitudes is far from over. Proponents of pessimism are at odds 
with those that argue that income influences immigration attitudes. Furthermore, recent 
study on the micro and macro effects of economic, cultural and security contexts on 
                                               
23 Citrin, et al., “Public opinion toward immigration”, 861. 
24 Ibid, 860-861. 
25 Citrin, et al., “Public opinion toward immigration”, 858; Burns and Gimpel, “Economic insecurity, 
prejudicial stereotypes”, 222-223. 
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immigration attitudes hints at a more complex relationship altogether that challenges 
classic economic threat conceptualizations. Instead of finding that either poor 
socioeconomic status is associated with greater support for immigration restriction or that 
there is no relationship between the two variables, a 2018 analysis of the World Values 
Survey suggests that “middle income individuals express slightly more restrictionist 
attitudes than low income individuals and considerably more restrictionist attitudes than 
high income individuals.”26 One possible explanation is that middle earners are in a 
position where they feel they have more to lose from high levels of immigration than low 
earners do but not in such a high position that they feel their job and finances are secure.  
This finding opens the door for further investigation into the link between 
economic conditions at the individual level and immigration attitudes. Researchers 
disagree as to whether personal economic circumstances matter or whether perceptions of 
economic change may play a greater role in shaping public opinion. Prior findings that 
established a robust link between an individual’s position in the labor market and their 
immigration policy preferences are being challenged not only by those that endorse a null 
relationship but also by new findings that reveal a more dynamic relationship. Further 
research is needed to determine the nature of the relationship between individual financial 
circumstances and immigration policy attitudes and assess whether economic self-interest 
is competitive with effects of contact and cultural marginality. 
  
                                               
26 Young, Loebach, and Korinek, “Global immigration policy attitudes”, 93. 
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3 Data and Methods  
 To pursue this relationship further, this study capitalizes on a recent cross-
sectional survey carried out by graduate students of Johns Hopkins University’s Survey 
Methodology course through the Amazon Mechanical Turks online platform. This survey 
consists of 25 questions on a wide variety of topics, from more conventional 
demographics to opinions on recent events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
Black Lives Matter movement.27 A summary of the survey statistics for all the variables 
can be found in Appendix A. 
The survey data consists of 1,100 responses from Amazon Mechanical Turks 
(Turks). Turks are individuals that are hired remotely to perform discrete on-demand 
tasks. All members of the population are located in the United States and 18 years or 
older. While the respondents are all part of the U.S. adult population and vary in age, 
race, political affiliation, and other characteristics, this is not necessarily a representative 
sample of the U.S. adult population. A 2012 study found that, relative to other 
convenience samples, Turks are cheaper to recruit and often more representative of the 
general population; however, they are younger and more liberal than the public.28 This 
limits the validity of the statistical inference that can be drawn from the analysis. In 
addition to this selection bias, one must also consider possible biases associated with the 
delivery method. While an online survey is increasingly becoming a method of choice for 
its cost-effectiveness and speed, it may suffer from some minor biases due to primacy 
effects and lack of interviewer presence to clarify questions.  
                                               
27 Johns Hopkins University AS.470.764.81.SU20 Survey Methodology Course, "SU20 survey final". 
28 Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, “Evaluating Online Labor Markets”, 366. 
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 Of the 25 variables in the survey (shown in Appendix A), the first eleven are 
incorporated into an ordered logistic regression model to better determine relationship 
between individual economic circumstances and immigration policy attitudes. 
Immigration, the dependent variable, is drawn from a survey question in which the Turks 
are to rate their level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree to the 
following statement “Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: ‘There should be greater restrictions on immigration to the United States.’” 
Thus, higher values of the Immigration variable denote more support for greater 
immigration restrictions than lower values.  
Two dependent variables are considered as economic determinants of the 
Immigration variable value: Income and Financial Security. Income, another ordinal 
variable, is defined as the personal annual income earned in the last year, after taxes and 
is grouped into buckets (e.g. less than $20,000, $20,000 to $59,999, etc.). This variable 
provides the necessary measure to test the aforementioned job threat and resources 
hypotheses, which would anticipate a negative relationship between Income and 
Immigration. In general, one would expect on average that a Turk with a lower income to 
be more supportive of establishing greater immigration restrictions than a Turk with a 
higher income.  
As opposed to the Income variable, the Financial Security variable focuses more 
upon pessimism hypothesis that prescribes that, regardless of income, those that feel their 
economic health is decreasing will be more likely to favor restrictions on immigration. 
Financial Security is an effective measure of relative perceptions of economic health 
since it is a dichotomous variable that measures whether Turks feel they are better or 
12 
worse off financially than they were a year ago. Given this hypothesis, one would expect 
that on average a Turk who feels worse off financially this year as opposed to last would 
be more in favor of increasing immigration restrictions than a Turk who feels better off. 
 In addition to the independent variable and the two economic variables, an 
alternative group threat theory is explored further through the COVID-19 Concern and 
Election Trust variables. Pursuant to Blalock’s Group Threat theory, one would expect 
people who are more concerned about COVID-19 or less confident in the government’s 
ability to ensure the following of proper election procedures to feel more threatened in 
general and, therefore, to also be more restrictionist in their immigration attitudes. Thus, 
a positive relationship between the COVID-19 Concern variable and the Immigration 
variable or a negative relationship between the Election Trust and Immigration variable 
would support Blalock’s threat hypothesis as opposed to the aforementioned economic 
hypotheses.   
 Six final variables are considered as control variables: Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Ideology, and Party. While the relationship between these variables and 
Immigration is not the focus of the analysis, it is expected that Turks that self-identify as 
more conservative and Republican more strongly support greater immigration restrictions 
than Turks that self-identify as more liberal and Democratic.  
One important consideration with respect to the above variables is item-missing 
data. As one can see in Appendix A, questions vary in number of unanswered responses 
from 0 to 12, or 0% to 3% of the dataset. The lack of responses does not seem to follow 
any logical rationale. Accordingly, in order to optimize the handling of missing data and 
prevent bias, multiple imputation is used to fill in the gaps. The statistical analysis is run 
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with four variations of the dataset with imputed values and the variation between the 
different outputs and results was found to be negligible. The results below are an average 
taken between the four datasets.  
 In terms of statistical methods, ordered logistic regression is used in this analysis 
since Immigration is ordinal and the dependent variable of interest. P-values are used to 
evaluate whether relationships are statistically significant at 5% significance level. The 
brant test is also employed to assess the parallel regression assumption (i.e. verify if the 
coefficients that describe the odds of being in the lowest category vs. all higher categories 
of the response variable are the same as those that describe the odds between the second 
lowest category and all higher categories, and so on). Odds ratios are calculated from 
coefficients to help put in perspective the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. Finally, cross-tabulations are used to dive deeper into the 




Using ordered logistic regression analysis, the August 2020 Amazon Mechanical 
Turk Survey data is analyzed to examine the effects of respondents’ personal economic 
characteristics on their opinion toward imposing greater immigration restrictions in the 
United States. The complete list of the variables used in this analysis, corresponding 
questions, response options, and coding can be found in Appendix B.  
Table 1. Effects of Individual Characteristics on Respondent Attitudes Toward 









Election Trust 0.230** 
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Party (0 = Democrat) 













Source: Johns Hopkins University AS.470.764.81.SU20 Survey Methodology Course, "SU20 survey final" 
Note: Cell entries are ordered logistic coefficients, with standard errors reported in parentheses. 




 The regression results in Table 1 indicate that age, education, income, concern 
over COVID-19 and some party measures do not to have a statistically significant effect 
on immigration preferences; however, whether the respondent identified Republican as 
opposed to Democrat, their gender, race, ideology, level of trust in election procedures 
and whether they report themselves being better or worse off financially this year than 
last year are statistically significant. While these coefficients have no direct interpretation 
in terms of magnitude, the direction of the relationship can be confirmed. For example, 
more conservative Turks are more likely to favor greater immigration restrictions than 
more liberal Turks and, perhaps more surprising, Turks that identified as white are more 
likely to oppose immigration restrictions than Turks who did not identify as white.  
 However, while these coefficients are useful, it is important to incorporate the 
brant test to evaluate whether the coefficients are in the same direction across ordinal 
categories for ordinal variables. This is referred to as the parallel regression assumption. 
The results indicate that the model as a whole confirms that the assumption holds. 
However, the Election Trust variable did not hold; therefore, it does not demonstrate a 
consistent, positive relationship across all values of the variable.   
 By examining in greater detail the odds ratios in Figure 1 below, one can infer 
more information regarding the magnitude of the relationships between the immigration 
variable and other variables. The odds ratio reflects the change in odds of a Turk being 
more likely to favor greater immigration restrictions, for each one-unit change in the 
dependent variable. For example, the odds ratio for the Republican party, 3.19, indicates 
that for Republicans, the odds of being more likely to agree with a statement supporting 
greater immigration restrictions is 3.19 times higher than it is for Democrats, holding 
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constant all other variables. An even more understandable estimate, the percent change in 
odds for each unit change in the independent variable, can be calculated by subtracting 1 
from the odds ratio and multiplying by 100. Continuing with the interpretation of the 
Republican variable, this signifies that Republicans are 219% more likely to support 
greater immigration restrictions than Democrats. 
Figure 1. Odds Ratios for Variables of Interest 
















Source: Johns Hopkins University AS.470.764.81.SU20 Survey Methodology Course, "SU20 survey final" 
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restrictions, whereas only 43% of  Turks that reported they were worse of agreed or 
strongly agreed. Alternatively, only 22% of better off Turks disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with restrictions, in contrast to 32% of worse off Turks.    
These findings contradict the popular pessimism hypothesis that states that if one 
is “on a downward economic trajectory,” they will believe immigration has a more 
tangible cost to them and will, therefore, have greater restrictionist sentiment.29 Perhaps 
other factors such as empathy and kinship with immigrants who may be in similar 
financial circumstances should be considered in future research to further explain these 
findings. Another possible consideration is the Allport’s contact theory. Proponents of 
this theory would speculate that Turks that identified themselves as worse off financially 
may live in closer proximity or come into contact with immigrants more frequently than 
those who are better off, leading them to have less restrictive opinions of immigration.  
Although the regression results in Table 1 do not find income to have a 
statistically significant influence on immigration preferences, it is still worth exploring 
further through a cross-tabulation analysis what the nature of the relationship looks like 
between the Income and Immigration variables and how it compares with existing 
literature.  While the majority of researchers either have either found a null relationship 
between income and immigration or found lower income individuals to be more in 
support of immigration restrictions than higher income ones, a 2018 analysis of the 
World Values Survey suggests that “middle income individuals express slightly more 
restrictionist attitudes than low income individuals and considerably more restrictionist 
attitudes than high income individuals.”30 
                                               
29 Ibid, 860-861. 
30 Young, Loebach, and Korinek “Global immigration policy attitudes”, 93. 
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 This analysis provides support for the hypothesis that personal economic 
circumstances determine immigration policy attitudes. While perception of relative 
financial security is found to be statistically significant, with those better off being more 
likely to agree or strongly agree with imposing greater restrictions, income is not 
statistically significant. However, some of the cross-tabulation results may give limited 
support to new evidence conveying that middle earners may favor more restrictive 
policies than low or high earners. Taking both economic variables together, the fact that 
Financial Security, which measures at change in financial security from last year to this 
year, was found significant whereas Income was not suggests that recent (and possibly 
temporary) perceived changes in financial circumstances have more of an impact on 
shifting immigration attitudes than more stable and less subjective financial measures. 
 While the economic variables shed light on the nature of the relationship between 
personal finances and immigration preferences, it is important to consider other theories 
such as Blalock’s group threat theory. Supporters of this theory would expect a Turk who 
is more in favor of immigration restrictions to display other characteristics of feeling 
threatened. The Election Trust and COVID-19 Concern variables offer insight into this 
theory.  
Given the positive coefficient for the Election Trust variable in Table 1, Turks 
who are more in favor of immigration restrictions are actually more trusting in the federal 
and local government’s ability to ensure proper electoral procedures and accurate results. 
However, this result must be considered with some scrutiny, since the parallel regression 





 Existing research on determining factors of immigration attitudes has largely 
revolved around Allport’s contact theory and Blalock’s group threat theory; in contrast, 
personal financial circumstances have been largely discounted by social researchers as 
playing a role in shaping opinions on immigration. By applying ordered logistic 
regression to recent data from an Amazon Mechanical Turk survey, this study provides 
evidence that finances are significant influences upon immigration preferences. On 
average, Turks who view themselves as better off financially this year as opposed to last 
year are more likely to favor the establishment of greater immigration restrictions than 
those who view themselves as worse off. The findings also complement other research 
that indicates that middle earners are more likely to favor restrictions than low or high 
earners.31  
 Furthermore, the results from this study challenge Blalock theory, illustrating that 
other characteristics of threat (concerns over COVID-19 or free and fair elections) do not 
correspond to being restrictive of immigration. In fact, they actually indicate the opposite. 
Turks who are more concerned about contracting COVID-19 or are less confident about 
election procedures being followed are actually found more likely to oppose the 
establishment of greater immigration restrictions. These findings open the door for 
theories around financial incentives to emerge to shed more light on public opinion 
toward immigration.  
 Understanding what factors drive anti-immigration opinions and xenophobic 
attitudes is increasingly important today. According to the World Migration Report 2020 
from the International Organization for Migration, "there have been major migration and 
                                               
31 Young, Loebach, and Korinek “Global immigration policy attitudes”, 93. 
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displacement events during the last two years," primarily due to conflict or severe 
economic and political instability.32 The number of international migrants has steadily 
increased over time to a total of 272 million international migrants today, 3.5% of the 
world's population.33 Given this increase, it is important to better understand what factors 
shape public perception on immigration in order for governments to anticipate and 
counteract outlashes of xenophobic violence and ensure that its immigration policies set 
up their citizens, immigrants, and the larger community for success.  
 The implications of this study are far-reaching; nevertheless, the findings are 
limited by certain aspects of the data. Perhaps most importantly, the survey population 
for this study was collected through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. As such, the 
ability to generalize these findings to the U.S. adult population is limited since it the 
respondents are not representative of that population. As mentioned above, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk surveys, while superior to convenience samples, are noted for capturing 
a younger and more liberal population than the U.S. adult population.34 Therefore, the 
external validity may be an issue when generalizing these findings to a larger scale. In 
addition, while the findings on income are of great interest, an ordered regression 
analysis did not map well the relationship between income and immigration preferences, 
given that the relationship appears to be nonlinear and U-shaped. Finally, it is important 
to seek out measures to evaluate Allport’s contact theory and incorporate this into a more 
comprehensive analysis. 
 These results provoke a clear need for a deeper investigation into the determinants 
of immigration attitudes. Further examination of the role of income and other financial 
                                               
32 International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2020, 2. 
33 International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2020, 21. 
34 Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, “Evaluating Online Labor Markets”, 366. 
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measures in influencing immigration policy attitudes is needed to groundtruth the finding 
that middle earners are more restrictive in their immigration opinions than low or high 
earners. Additionally, more robust measures to assess competing theories are needed. 
These include data that more directly captures conceptions of threat and the nature of 
respondents’ contact with immigrants, including frequency and depth. Capturing whether 
respondents reside in rural or urban areas could also prove enlightening.  
Finally, these factors need to be captured together comprehensively in a dataset 
that has more observations and is more representative of the U.S. adult population in 
order to ensure the external validity of its results. On the whole, the field of immigration 
policy remains theory-rich; for this reason, there is much opportunity for social 
researchers to dive deeper into statistical analysis and harness evidence to inform future 
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7.1 Appendix A. Survey Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Survey Questions and Results 
Immigration Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “There should be greater 
restrictions on immigration to the United States.” 
N % N 
 Strongly Disagree 179 16% 
 Disagree 92 8% 
 Neither agree nor disagree 211 19% 
 Agree 385 35% 
 Strongly Agree 213 19% 
 No Response 20 2% 
Financial 
Security 
We are interested in how people are getting along 
financially these days.  Would you say that you (and 
your family living here) are BETTER off or WORSE 
off financially than you were a year ago? 
N % N 
Worse off financially 332 30% 
Better off financially 736 67% 
No Response 32 3% 
Income What was your personal annual earned income this 
past year before taxes? 
N % N 
 less than $20,000 99 9% 
 $20,000-$59,999 481 44% 
 $60,000-$99,999 322 29% 
 $100,000-$149,999 129 12% 
 $150,000-$199,999 39 4% 
 $200,000 or more 15 1% 




Based on COVID-19’s reported potential impacts to 
one’s health, to what extent are you concerned about 
personally contracting COVID-19? 
N % N 
No Opinion 34 3% 
Not at All 117 11% 
Slightly Concerned 358 33% 
Concerned 403 37% 
Very Concerned 167 15% 
No Response 21 2% 
Election 
Trust  
How confident are you in the federal and local 
government’s ability to ensure proper electoral 
procedures and accurate results for the November 
2020 general election? 
N % N 
 Very Unconfident 98 9% 
 Somewhat Unconfident 207 19% 
 Neutral 257 23% 
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Somewhat Confident 357 32% 
Very Confident 158 14% 
No Response 23 2% 
Age What is your age (in years)?   
 Median Mean Std Dev 
 35 39 60.7 
Gender What is your gender? N % N 
 Male 473 43% 
 Female 622 57% 
 Other, please specify 5 <1% 
Race What racial/ethnic group, if any, do you belong? 
(Check all that apply) 
N % N 
 White, Caucasian 651 59% 
 Not White, Caucasian 440 40% 
 No Response 9 1% 
Education What is your level of education? N % N 
 Some High School 6 1% 
 High School Diploma 61 6% 
 Some College/AA 188 17% 
 College Degree/BA/BS 536 49% 
 Graduate Degree 295 27% 
 No Response 14 1% 
Ideology When it comes to politics do you usually think of 
yourself as 
N % N 
very liberal 146 13% 
liberal 299 27% 
slightly liberal 135 12% 
moderate or middle of the road 169 15% 
slightly conservative 112 10% 
conservative 161 15% 
very conservative 69 6% 
No Response 9 1% 
Party What political party, if any, are you a member of? N % N 
Democrat 427 39% 
Republican 442 40% 
Independent/unaffiliated 211 19% 
Other (please describe) 8 1% 
No Response 12 1% 
Vote Did you intend on voting in the presidential election 
this November? 
N % N 
Yes 983 89% 
No 82 7% 








Some people don’t pay much attention to the political 
campaigns.  
How about you, would you say that you have 
been/were very much interested, somewhat 
interested, or not much interested in following the 
political campaigns this past year? 
N % N 
Very Much Interested 407 37% 
Somewhat Interested 540 49% 
Not Much Interested 106 10% 
Not At All Interested 28 3% 
No Response 19 2% 
Police 
Funding 
What is your opinion on the current government 
funding levels for the police department(s) in your 
local jurisdiction? 
N % N 
The police department(s) should no longer receive 
any government funding. 
125 11% 
The police department(s) should receive less 
government funding than it currently receives. 
399 36% 
The police department(s) should continue to receive 
the same amount of government funding. 
358 33% 
The police department(s) should receive more 
government funding than it currently receives. 
137 12% 
I am unsure or have no opinion on the government 
funding of police department(s). 
70 6% 
No Response 11 1% 
Gender 
Inclusion 
In order to ensure fair representation in leadership 
positions, organizations should be legally required to 
implement gender inclusive placement policies. 
N % N 
Strongly Agree 179 16% 
Agree 442 40% 
Neutral 309 28% 
Disagree 86 8% 
Strongly Disagree 67 6% 




When considering your monthly income as compared 
to your monthly expenses (utility bills, rent or 
mortgage, student loans, food, and entertainment, 
etc.) and ability to save for retirement, how would 
you rate your financial security? 
N % N 
Very Poor 84 8% 
Poor 201 18% 
Neutral 366 33% 
Good 361 33% 
Very Good 77 7% 
No Response 11 1% 
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On the scale of 1 to 5, how much do you believe 
traditional or established broadcasting or publishing 
news outlets (e.g. FOX, CNN, ABC, Washington 
Post, Wall Street Journal, etc…) adhere to the 
following journalism principles:  
- My news source exhibits truth and accuracy, gives 
all the relevant facts and checks the information it 
provides me, or tells me when it cannot corroborate 
information. 
- My news source is independent and does not act 
formally or informally, on behalf of special interests 
whether political, corporate or cultural, and declares 
any information that might constitute a conflict of 
interest. 
- My news source is fair and impartial, stories are 
balanced and add context. 
- My news source exhibits humanity and is aware and 
cares for the impact of words and images on the lives 
of others. 
- My news sources is accountable and when it 
commits an error, it corrects them. 
N % N 
strongly disagree 132 12% 
disagree 193 18% 
don’t know 221 20% 
agree 486 44% 
strongly agree 56 5% 
No Response 12 1% 
Universal 
Healthcare 
Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: “The federal government should be 
responsible for ensuring that all Americans have 
healthcare coverage” 
N % N 
Strongly agree 315 29% 
Agree 432 39% 
Neither agree nor disagree 193 18% 
Disagree 87 8% 
Strongly disagree 52 5% 
No Response 21 2% 
COVID-19 
Vaccine 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approves vaccines once they demonstrate safety and 
effectiveness in human clinical trials. If an FDA 
approved COVID-19 vaccine becomes available at 
no cost to you, would you receive the vaccine? 
N % N 
 Definitely not 82 7% 
 Probably not 130 12% 
 Unsure 228 21% 
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Probably 386 35% 
Definitely 258 23% 




With 10 representing "completely satisfied," and 1 
representing "not at all satisfied," how would you rate 
your satisfaction with how the United States federal 
government has handled the COVID-19 situation to 
this point? 
N % N 
1. Not at all satisfied 190 17% 
2. 93 8% 
3. 121 11% 
4. 99 9% 
5. 106 10% 
6. 112 10% 
7. 140 13% 
8. 131 12% 
9. 47 4% 
10. Completely satisfied 51 5% 
No Response 10 1% 
Civic 
Engagement 
I feel that if I communicate my opinion on a political 
issue I care about to government officials (through 
phone, radio, email, social media, protest, and/or 
mail), I make a difference in my community.” 
N % N 
strongly agree 94 9% 
agree 423 38% 
neither agree nor disagree 275 25% 
disagree 214 19% 
Strongly disagree 68 6% 
No Response 26 2% 
Surrogacy With the advance of science and technology, people 
who are unable to have their own biological child can 
still achieve their desire to have a child. One of the 
effective ways is surrogacy. Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose or strongly oppose allowing surrogacy 
legally? 
N % N 
Strongly favor 287 26% 
Favor 620 56% 
Oppose 145 13% 
Strongly oppose 26 2% 
No Response 22 2% 
Parent When it comes to raising children, which best 
describes you? 
N % N 
I am a parent. 501 46% 
I do not yet have children, but I plan to in the future. 182 17% 
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I would like to have children, but do not anticipate 
that I will. 
208 19% 
I definitely do not want to have any children. 122 11% 
I have not yet decided whether or not I want children. 65 6% 
No Response 22 2% 
Type of 
Worker 
Everyone's career has a great influence on his values 
and politics, so we are very interested in learning 
about your job. Can you tell me about your current 
occupation? Please choose one of the following 
options: 
N % N 
White collar worker 708 64% 
Blue-collar worker 310 28% 
Other (please describe) 66 6% 
No Response 16 1% 
Presidential 
Election 
Who would you vote for in the presidential election 
this November? (Whether you intend to vote or not) 
N % N 
Donald J. Trump 575 52% 
Joseph R. Biden 463 42% 
Other (please specify) 51 5% 
No Response 11 1% 
Source: Johns Hopkins University AS.470.764.81.SU20 Survey Methodology Course, "SU20 survey final" 
Note: Variables in green were used in the ordered logistic regression model, whereas variables in gray were 




7.2 Appendix B. Variables Used in Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Questionnaire Item and Text Coding 
Immigration ‘There should be greater 
restrictions on immigration to 
the United States.’ 
Ordinal variable recoded 1-5: 
1 = ‘Strongly Disagree 
2 = ‘Disagree’ 
3 = ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ 
4 = ‘Agree’ 




‘We are interested in how people 
are getting along financially 
these days.  Would you say that 
you (and your family living 
here) are BETTER off or 
WORSE off financially than you 
were a year ago?’ 
Recoded as dummy variable:  
0 =  ‘Worse off financially’ 
1 = ‘Better off financially’ 
Income ‘What was your personal annual 
earned income this past year 
before taxes?’ 
Ordinal variable recoded 1-6:  
1 = ‘less than $20,000’ 
2 = ‘$20,000-$59,999’ 
3 = $60,000-$99,999’ 
4 = ‘$100,000-$149,999’ 
5 = ‘$150,000-$199,999’ 
6 = ‘$200,000 or more’ 
COVID-19 
Concern 
Based on COVID-19’s reported 
potential impacts to one’s health, 
to what extent are you concerned 
about personally contracting 
COVID-19? 
Ordinal variable recoded 1-5: 
1 = ‘No Opinion’ 
2 = ‘Not at All’ 
3 = ‘Slightly Concerned’ 
4 = ‘Concerned’ 
5 = ‘Very Concerned’ 
Election 
Trust 
How confident are you in the 
federal and local government’s 
ability to ensure proper electoral 
procedures and accurate results 
for the November 2020 general 
election? 
Ordinal variable recoded 1-5: 
1 = ‘Very Unconfident 
2 = ‘Somewhat Unconfident’ 
3 = ‘Neutral’ 
4 = ‘Somewhat Confident’ 
5 = ‘Very Confident’ 
Age ‘What is your age (in years)?’ Continuous variable coded from 18 to 
79 years 
Gender ‘What is your gender?’ 
 
Recoded as dummy variable:  
0 = ‘Male’;  
1 = ‘Female’ 
Race  ‘What racial/ethnic group, if 
any, do you belong?’ 
 
Recoded as dummy variable:  
0 = ‘White, Caucasian’ 






Appendix B. (continued) 
 
Education ‘What is your level of 
education?’ 
 
Ordinal variable recoded 1-5:  
1 =  ‘Some High School’ 
2 = ‘High School Diploma’  
3 = ‘Some College/AA’ 
4 = ‘College Degree/BA/BS’  
5 = ‘Graduate Degree’ 
Ideology ‘When it comes to politics do 
you usually think of yourself as’ 
 
Ordinal variable recoded 1-7: 
1 = ‘very liberal’ 
2 = ‘liberal’ 
3 = ‘slightly liberal’ 
4 = ‘moderate or middle of the road’ 
5 = ‘slightly conservative’ 
6 = ‘conservative’ 
7 = ‘very conservative’ 
Party 
 
‘What political party are you a 
member of?’ 
Recoded as dummy variables 
comparing each of the other response 
options - Republican, 
Independent/Unaffiliated, Other (1) 
with Democrat (0) 
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